Structural Models of the Wage Curve Estimated by Panel Data and Cross-Section Regressions by Gerba, Eddie et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Structural Models of the Wage Curve
Estimated by Panel Data and
Cross-Section Regressions
Eddie Gerba and Emmanuel Pikoulakis and Tomasz Piotr
Wisniewski
London School of Economics, University of Hull, University of
Leicester
26. February 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59263/
MPRA Paper No. 59263, posted 15. October 2014 12:14 UTC
1 
 
 
The Allocation of Non-Leisure Time and the Price of Capital: 
A Model Applied Empirically to the Wage Curve1 
 
 
 
Eddie Gerba 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton St. 
 London WC2A 2AE, UK 
E.E.Gerba@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
Emmanuel V. Pikoulakis 
University of Hull 
Cottingham Road 
Hull HU6 7RX, UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 1482 865 803 
    Epikoulaki@aol.com 
 
 
Tomasz Piotr Wisniewski
2
 
University of Leicester 
School of Management 
Ken Edwards Building 
University Road 
Leicester LE1 7RH, UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 116 252 3958 
Tpw5@leicester.ac.uk 
  
                                                          
1
 The authors are grateful to Camelia Minoiu for her valuable help and Andrew Oswald for providing useful 
comments on the earlier draft of the paper. Emmanuel Pikoulakis would also like to thank Tassos Malliaris, George 
Kaufman, all the members of the Department of Economics and the Department of Finance at the Loyola University 
Chicago and the Department of Economics and Commerce of the University of Otago for providing most hospitable 
and stimulating environment during his research visits. Christopher Pissarides is also acknowledged for providing 
encouragement in the early stages of the paper. Authors retain all responsibility for errors and omissions.  
2
 Corresponding author.  
2 
 
 
 
The Allocation of Non-Leisure Time and the Price of Capital:  
A Model Applied Empirically to the Wage Curve 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Our aim in this paper is, first, to derive a model capable of explaining the 
stylized fact that fluctuations in labor market activities over the business cycle 
are primarily accommodated by changes in employment rather than in wages 
and, secondly, to test this model empirically. The model is simple, analytically 
tractable, capable of explaining a wide range of labor market behavior and, 
crucially, capable of explaining away real wage rigidities without resorting to 
market imperfections. Second, when tested empirically, the model is found to be 
strongly supported by the data of a diverse spectrum of economies. As it turns 
out, our model shares a key property with Phelps (1994) and Phelps and Zoega 
(1998), namely, that variations in the price of assets play a pivotal role in 
explaining variations in employment and in wage rates.  
 
Keywords: Wage Curve; Price of Capital; Intratemporal and Intertemporal 
Substitution; Homework 
JEL Codes: E22, E23, E24, J22, J23, J24 
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1. Introduction 
The stylized fact that fluctuations in labor market activity over the business cycle are 
accommodated primarily by changes in employment rather than changes in real wage rates, comes 
by the name of real wage rigidities. Neoclassical macroeconomics maintains that such rigidities 
are the outcome of optimizing behavior. Building on the pioneering work of Lucas and Rapping 
(1969), economists in the neoclassical tradition espouse the hypothesis that workers substitute 
their work effort inter-temporally on the basis of the current real wage rate, the future real wage 
rate and the real interest rate. Economists in the New Keynesian tradition cast doubt on this 
scenario because, as they argue, there is not sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that labor 
supply is highly elastic or that shifts in labor supply play a prominent role in business cycle 
fluctuations
3
. Instead, these economists attribute wage rigidities to market imperfections
4
.  
However, empirical findings on labor supply are likely to be biased because they do not 
typically allow for homework. For instance, as Rupert et al. (2000) report, omitting homework 
activity biases downwards the responsiveness of market hours to the real wage rate and, therefore, 
a model of labor supply that allows for a household sector is more likely to fit the data. To quote 
Benhabib et al. (1991): "In contrast to the standard model, which relies exclusively on 
inter-temporal substitution, the home production model also includes intra-temporal substitution 
between market work and homework at a given point in time. This makes the labor supply 
response in the home production economy more similar to that in the data ...". What these 
observations suggest is that to capture empirical responses of labor supply more accurately a 
researcher ought to account for the effect of homework activities. To this effect, in what follows, 
we shall be distinguishing between a market sector that includes all types of economic activities 
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 See Romer (1996), Sections 4.10 and 101. 
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4 
 
recorded in the national statistics and a household sector defined to include the types of economic 
activities which are classified as homework and, as such, not recorded in national statistics.  
With a market sector coexisting with a household sector, it would be natural to conjecture 
that those who are not part of the labor force as well as those who are unemployed or part-time 
employed spend their non-leisure time in homework or in some of the activities that define the 
"informal economy”. For instance, the data reported by Borland and Venn (2004) suggests that the 
unemployed in Australia spend approximately the same time as those who are part-time employed 
in activities such as domestic work, child care, voluntary work and care, and education and 
training. The same data also suggests that there is little difference between the unemployed and 
those not in the labor force as regards to the time each of these groups spends in non-market 
production activities and in education and training. As Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) report: 
"... household activities involve approximately as much capital as business activities and three 
times as much (non-sleeping) time...". What these observations seem to suggest is that homework 
may offer an attractive alternative to full-time market work for those who are voluntarily 
unemployed or part-time employed. This would be particularly true if, for instance, workers have 
access to non-wage income. In any event, to model labor supply satisfactorily one would have to 
address the allocation of non-leisure time between market work and homework.     
We consider two types of economic activities: an activity that specializes in the production 
of a single, final good, the consumption good, and an activity that specializes in installing capital 
broadly defined to include household capital. Firms that produce the consumption good comprise 
the final-goods sector which is identified with the entire market sector. Firms specializing in 
installing capital operate in the intermediary-goods sector. Unlike the output of the final-goods 
sector which is transacted entirely in the market sector, only part of the output of the 
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intermediary-goods sector is thought to be transacted in the market since, by assumption, installing 
capital can involve household capital whose installation may be classified as homework. The 
typical agent in this model divides her entire non-leisure time between the final- goods sector and 
the intermediary-goods sector. To the extent that employment in the household sector is not 
recorded in statistics, a reallocation of labor supply from the production of the final good to the 
installation of capital, broadly defined to include household capital, may result in raising 
unemployment.  
To fix ideas imagine a world dominated by small family establishments, each producing a 
single marketable good which can either be used for current consumption or for investment. The 
act of converting this good into installed capital requires time. During periods when demand for 
the consumption good is low some members of the family may find it profitable to reallocate some 
of their time in favor of installing physical and/or human capital. For instance, they may redecorate 
and refurbish their establishment, they may install residential capital and/or non-residential 
capital, and they may improve their skills through additional schooling and/or off the job training. 
In that scenario, periods of low measured productivity will be associated with labor hours being 
reallocated from the provision of current marketable goods and services to the provision of 
services that increase future potential output. Taking account of the fact, as Greenwood and 
Hercowitz (op.cit) observe, that household activities require as much capital as business activities, 
it would not be farfetched to expect that a reallocation of non-leisure time in favor of homework 
activities may well be associated with a rise in the rate of unemployment- a rise that would 
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overstate the degree of resource underutilization because those classified as unemployed are 
increasing value added to the economy.
5
  
In a free-market economy where firms are owned by private agents, a rise in the price of 
capital, for instance, by boosting non-wage earnings provides an incentive for an individual to 
reallocate her non-leisure time from the market sector to the household sector. At the same time, a 
rise in the price of capital by raising the user cost of capital induces firms to reduce labor demand. 
Thus, other things equal, a rise in the price of capital is accommodated, primarily, by a reduction in 
the rate of employment without inducing any substantial variation in the wage rate. Similarly, a 
reduction in the price of capital is thought to be accommodated primarily by a rise in the rate of 
employment. This example serves to illustrate the pivotal role that variations in the price of capital 
play in inducing an intra-temporal substitution of labor supply capable of explaining away 
real-wage rigidities. The reader can find some similarity between the above reasoning and the 
analysis in Phelps and Zoega (1998). 
But this is half of the story because a rise in the price of capital favors future consumption 
relative to present consumption and, thus, favors activities akin to installing capital. To the extent 
that homework includes activities akin to installing capital to that extent an increase in the price of 
capital favors a reallocation of non-leisure time in favor of homework through an inter-temporal 
substitution of labor supply. In short, variations in the price of capital induce intra-temporal as well 
                                                          
5 A more somber assessment is offered in Blanchard (2006) who, on page 5, observes: "One may have a relatively 
benign view of the shift from market to home work. The image is of a woman who decides to interrupt her career 
to stay home with her children, or of the man who decides to cut the grass rather than hire a gardener. But there 
may be more to the story. The woman who used to provide child care may have few other skills, and the same may 
be true for the gardener. Minimum wage or other constraints on wage may lead them to become and remain 
unemployed. The result in this case is less market work, more homework, and more unemployment." Minimum 
wage or other constraints on wage may lead them to become and remain unemployed. The result in this case is 
less market work, more homework, and more unemployment." 
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as inter-temporal substitution of labor supply effects that coincide and reinforce each other and 
that are capable of explaining away real wage rigidities. 
The label “wage-curve” can be traced to Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1994, 1995) and 
to Phelps (1994) and Phelps and Zoega (1998). Blanchflower and Oswald, for instance, use this 
label to describe an empirical regularity at the local level according to which the elasticity of the 
wage rate with respect to the rate of unemployment is about -0.1, a small enough number to be 
consistent with the phenomenon of real wage rigidities. Phelps (1994) and Phelps and Zoega 
(1998) use the same label to describe an equilibrium locus which is upward sloping in real wage 
rate-employment space. As alluded above, our model, like the models described in Phelps (1994) 
and Phelps and Zoega (1998), emphasizes, directly or indirectly, that asset prices and the ratio of 
non-wage income relative to wage income play a key role in determining wages and employment. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that our analysis leading to the derivation of the wage-curve bears 
similarities with the model of the wage-curve in Phelps and Phelps and Zoega. However whilst 
Phelps (op.cit.) and Phelps and Zoega (op.cit) focus on deriving the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment our main focus is on deriving the equilibrium wage rate consistent with behavior 
describing an optimizing representative agent who, as it turns out, does not need to resort to 
“shirking”.  
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the 
technologies of the final-goods sector and of the intermediary-goods sector. Section 3 describes 
the command optimum in a model economy where the typical agent maximizes the present value 
of her lifetime utility subject to the constraints of technology. Our typical agent must make two 
interdependent decisions: how best to allocate her consumption between the present and the future, 
and how best to allocate her non-leisure time between the final-goods sector and the 
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intermediary-goods sector. In Section 4 we describe asset market equilibrium focusing particular 
attention on the equilibrium price of capital. In Section 5 we derive a relation that links the 
equilibrium price of capital to the allocation of non-leisure time across sectors. As we show, this 
relation leads directly to an expression that captures the spirit of Okun’s law. In Section 6 we use 
our model to derive an expression for the equilibrium, hourly, wage-rate on the assumption that 
optimizing agents are operating in competitive markets. To test empirically the model derived in 
Section 6 we applied panel data regressions to a sample of macroeconomic data on labor market 
activity covering a cross-section of 20 OECD countries over a period of more than thirty years.  
Section 7 is devoted to describing the empirical methodology employed to test this model and to 
providing a comprehensive commentary on the empirical results obtained. In Section 8 we use our 
model to derive an alternative, simplified, version of the equilibrium wage rate that is suitable for 
empirical applications to developed as well as less developed economies. To estimate this 
wage-rate model we have applied a cross-section regression to a group of 45 economies that differ 
substantially in economic development. Section 9 presents a further empirical application of our 
model; an application which contributes to the explanation of the relative size of the informal 
economy. Section 10 summarizes results and concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Production of the Final Good and the Installation of Capital 
2.1 Notation  
In what follows Y  shall denote the output of the final–goods sector, C  the units of Y  
consumed, I  the units of Y  invested, K  the stock of capital, L  the labor force, N the number 
of workers engaged in the production of Y , h  the index of skills embodied in the representative 
agent, v  the fraction of the labor force engaged in producing Y , )1( v  the fraction of the labor 
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force engaged in the intermediary-goods sector, hr  the number of hours the representative agent 
allocates to non-leisure activities, A  the index of labor-augmenting technological progress, and
  the marginal product per worker hour in the final-goods sector. We shall let hNhrH   denote 
the number of skilled worker hours supplied in the final-goods sector and Ah/~    denote the 
marginal product per effective worker hour in that sector. To denote the growth rate of population, 
the growth rate of labor-augmenting technical progress, the rate of capital depreciation, and the 
rate of time preference we shall use ,, gn  and  respectively.  
Since by definition hr  measures the hours a representative agent allocates to non-leisure 
activities, the remainder time (measured by 24- hr ) is meant to include all types of breaks this 
agent can enjoy lawfully during the prescribed working time. 
 
2.2. The Technology of Producing the Final Good 
To model the production of Y it is convenient to use the version of the neoclassical 
production in Jones (2001) to write: 
KKYLLYKYAhNhrAhvLhrKAhvLhr
AhNhrKAhNhrAHKAHKAHY
)/()/()/)(()/)((
)/)(()/)(()(
)1/(
1






 [1] 
To define ,, KY and C in intensive form we shall employ the following expressions: 
),/(~ AhLhrYy       ),/(
~
AhLhrKk    )/(~ AhL hrCc    [2] 
Accordingly, output per hour of effective human capital, y~ , and its properties are described by [3] 
and [4] below:  
akvvy
~
)/~(   [3] 
,0)
~
/~(  ky  ,0)
~
/
~
( 22  kk   )
~
/~( ky  as ,k
~
0  0 )k
~
/y~(  as k
~
 [4]  
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2.3 The Intermediate-Goods Sector: The Technology for Installing Capital  
In the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model the act of converting the consumption good into 
installed capital is costless. One-sector models with installation costs typically employ an 
adjustment costs technology convex in the rate of change in the firm's capital stock. Important 
contributions in this literature include Abel and Blanchard (1983), Eisner and Strotz (1963), Gould 
(1968), Hayashi (1982), Lucas (1967), Treadway (1969) and Uzawa (1969). In two-sector models 
the marginal cost of investment consists of two parts: the cost of diverting resources from the 
production of the consumption good into the production of the investment good plus an installation 
cost component. For instance, Mussa (1977) defines the total marginal cost (TMC) of capital 
accumulation in terms of foregone consumption to include two components: (a) "the internal 
marginal cost of investment incurred directly by consumption goods producers" and (b) "the 
marginal cost of diverting labor into capital goods production". He goes on to say that the latter 
marginal cost “may be thought of as "external" to the individual consumption goods producer, 
even though it is clearly internal to the economy”.  
In this model the opportunity cost of installing capital consists of the cost of diverting labor 
from the final-goods sector to the intermediate-goods sector. Each period, the intermediate-goods 
sector transforms I  units of the final good into I  units of installed capital. By assumption this 
sector employs only labor, and the fraction of the labor force engaged in this sector relative to the 
ratio of gross investment-to-capital shall be measured by . Thus, the activities of the 
intermediate-goods sector can be described by:  
 )/(]
~
/)~~[()1( KIkcyv     [5]  
One may interpret  as a parameter affecting the process of installing capital such that, 
other things equal, innovations that raise (reduce)  are associated with a reduction (increase) in 
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the productivity of labor in the intermediate-goods sector. A broad definition of the labor time 
required for installing capital would include DIY type of activities, time spent in installing 
consumer durable appliances, in refurbishing and decorating, and in acquiring new skills.  
 
3. Deriving the Command Optimum 
3.1. The Objective of the Central Planner 
The objective of the central planner is to maximize the present (discounted) value of the 
utility of an infinitely lived representative agent. To fix ideas, let )~(cU denote the instantaneous 
utility of the representative agent with the following properties: 
,0)~(/ cU  ,0)~(// cU    )~(/ cU   as ,c~ 0   0)~(/ cU  as c~  
The task of the central planner can now be described as follows:  
Maximize: 
dtecU t


0
)~(   [6a] 
Subject to: 
kngcytk
~
)()~~()/
~
(  ,   and  ]
~
/)~~([)1( kcyv    
Where: ak
~
vy~  1 , given:k
~
0 ,  y
~c~ 0  
 
The Lagrangian for this problem is given by: 
         [6b] 
The first two terms of [6b] constitute the Hamiltonian whilst the last term introduces the labor 
input required in the process of installing capital in the form of an equality constraint. Accordingly, 
the Current Value Lagrangian may be written as follows: 
]}
~
/)~~([)1({)(]
~
)()~~([)()~( kcyvtkngcytecU t   
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tekcyvmkngcymcUc   ]}
~
/)~~([)1({]
~
)()~~([)~( 21  [6c] 
Where:
tetm  )(1   and,   
tetm  )(2      
 
3.2. The First-Order Conditions of the Command Optimum and the Shadow Price of 
Capital   
Since c~ lies in the interior of )~,0( y , v  must also lie in the interior of (0,1). Thus, we may 
assume an interior solution and express the first-order conditions as follows: 
0)~/(  cc  [7a] 
0)/(  vc  [7b] 
0)/( 2  mc  [7c] 
 
In addition, we must observe the equation of motion for the co-state variable 1m  and the state 
variable k
~
 given by [7d]-[7e] below: 
)
~
/()/( 11 kmtm c    [7d] 
)/(
~
)(~~)/
~
( 1mkgncytk c     [7e] 
As Pikoulakis (1997) shows, the conditions for saddle- path stability and the Arrow sufficiency 
criteria for a global maximum are satisfied in this context. 
The solution to [7a] and [7b] yields the following expressions: 
)
~
/()~( 21
/ kmmcU   [8a] 
)~()/~(])
~
/([)/~( /221 cUvymkmmvy    [8b] 
Rearranging [8a] -[8b] we arrive at:  
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)
~
/)(~()/~()
~
/()~( /121
/ kcUvymkmmcU    [8c] 
1
/ )}
~
/)(/~(1){~( mkvycU    [8d] 
qcUmkvy  )}~(/{)}
~
/)(/~(1{ /1  [8e] 
In [8d] above, 1m  defines the shadow price of installing a unit of newly created capital 
measured in (current) units of utility whilst in [8e] q  defines the shadow price of (gross) 
investment measured in (current) units of the consumption bundle. Accordingly, 1q  is the 
marginal cost of gross investment in units of the consumption bundle. To better appreciate the 
economics of the marginal cost of investment consider, first, manipulating [8e] and using [5] to 
arrive at: 
 )/)(
~
/~)(1()
~
/}](/))/~[{()
~
/)(/~(1 vkykvvvykvyq   [9a] 
     ])][/()1[()/)1)((/)(1()/)(/)(/)(1( hrvLvIvvvIYvKIIY    
where )1(   is the fraction of Y  absorbed in wages.  Rearranging [9a] we shall write:  
v
Nhr
v
Y
v
Iq 




 )1(
}
)1(
)1(
{  [9b] 
As [9b] makes clear, agents install gross investment to the point where the value added 
from such activity equals the opportunity cost of supplying labor to the final–goods sector, 
measured by foregone wages. Put another way, the opportunity cost of working in the final goods 
sector is the forgone value added from installing capital in the intermediary-goods sector.  
 
4. Solving for the Motion of the Co-State Variable  
4.1 Capital Market Equilibrium 
Applying some algebra to equations [6c], [7d], [8a] and [8b] we arrive at the condition that 
expresses capital market equilibrium given by:  
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  )~/~()/()/( ccqqq K
  [10] 
In [10], above,   the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and K is the net profit per 
unit of capital defined by: 
)/()/( KIKYK   [11] 
If we were to assume that labor-augmenting technical progress is growing at an 
exogenously determined rate equal to g  we would be able to express cc ~/~  as the difference 
between the growth rate of consumption per capita, )/( cc , and g  to write: gcccc  )/()~/~(  . 
Letting r denote the return on a riskless asset, consumption growth would then be described by: 
gcccc   )/()~/~(  gr    [12]  
Substituting [12] into [10] we arrive at:  
grqqq K   )/()/(   [13] 
Since 0)/()~/~(  qqcc   at the steady-state, long-run equilibrium requires that:  
  gr  [14] 
 )/( qK  [15] 
 
4.2. Capital Market Equilibrium, the Price of Capital, and the Share of the Labor Force 
Engaged in the Intermediate-Goods Sector 
Combining the definition of net profits per unit of capital in [11] with the relation between 
the dividend-yield and the rate of time preference in [15], we arrive at:   
qKIKYK   )/()/(  [16] 
By definition, the marginal product of capital, MPK , (to be identified with the user cost of capital) 
is given by: 
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)/()( KYqrMPK    [17a] 
Combining [16] with [17a] we arrive at:  
qKKqgqrKIqqr   )/()()()/()(   [17b] 
Solving for q  we arrive at: 
)]/()/[(   gKIq  [18] 
Using the expression given by [5] we can link q  with )1( v  as follows: 
))](/()1[(   gvq  [19] 
In [19], above, we have an expression that links, directly, the equilibrium price of capital with the 
share of labor force engaged in the intermediate-goods sector.  
 
5. The Allocation of Non-Leisure Time, the Price of Capital, and Okun’s Law 
To get a further insight into the relationship between the price of capital and the allocation 
of non-leisure time between sectors we shall let )/( YIs  define the saving rate taken to be 
constant, and rewrite [9b] as follows:  
}
)1(
}{
)1(
{}
)1(
}{
)1(
{}
)1(
}{
)1(
{)1(
sv
v
sY
Y
v
v
I
Y
v
v
q
 




  [20] 
Alternatively, and more conveniently, one can rearrange [20] to read as follows: 
1}
)1(
}{
)1(
{ 


sv
v
q

 [21] 
Assuming both sides of [21] are “sufficiently close” to one, we can take logarithms to arrive at: 
)/)1)((/)1(()ln( svvq   [22] 
Hitherto variations in )1( v  have been identified with variations of the proportion of the 
labor force engaged in the intermediary-goods sectors broadly defined to include the household 
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sector. If we were to assume that those who are not in the labor force are mainly "discouraged 
workers” and proceed to conjecture that the number of discouraged unemployed vary 
proportionately with the number of registered unemployed we would then be able to identify 
variations in )/)1(( vv  with proportional variations in the unemployment to employment ratio. 
Accordingly, letting u  denote the unemployment rate and )1( u  denote the employment rate 
we shall rewrite [22] as follows:  
)/)1)}((1/({(~)ln( suuq    ,  0~   [23a] 
Applying the   operator to [23a] above, evaluating the resulting expression at the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment to be denoted byu , and solving for u we arrive at : 
]
))1/(1)(/)1((~
ln
[
2us
q
u




 [23b] 
Observing that )
~
/~()/()( kyKYqrMPK   , assuming r  to be constant and solving for
qln  we arrive at: 
])ln)[(/)1((~ln)/)1((
~
ln~lnln gyykyq    [23c] 
Substituting [23c] into [23b] we arrive at a relation given by: 
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 [23d]  
Clearly, [23d] describes an Okun’s Law type relation. Whether the size of   matches the 
empirical values associated with the textbook relationship is an empirical matter. What the above 
analysis serves to re-affirm and illustrate is that the price of capital plays a pivotal role in allocating 
labor supply across sectors, a role which is consistent with the spirit of Okun’s Law .   
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6. Modeling the Competitive, Hourly, Real Wage Rate  
Our purpose in this section is to derive an expression for the hourly wage rate to be 
estimated empirically by panel data methods. If labor markets are competitive the equilibrium, 
hourly, real wage rate   is defined by:  
YNhrvLhr )1(    [24] 
Using equation [1] to substitute Y out of [24] we arrive at: 
)1/()/)()(1()/)(1(   KYAhNhrY  [25] 
Noting that by [17a] qrKYMPK )()/(   , and log-linearizing [25] we shall write:  
 )/ln()1/()ln()1ln(ln  MPKAh  [26] 
      qAhBrqAh ln)1/()ln()]/)ln(()[ln1/()ln()1ln(    
where: )]/)))[ln((1/(()1ln(   rB  
Using [23a] to substitute qln out of [26], and employing subscripts to denote the ith  
cross-sectional unit at time t  we shall restate [26] as follows: 
titiiti uusAhB ,,, )}1/({
~)/()ln(ln    [27] 
The simplest way to model the effectiveness of human capital is to assume that it consists of the 
following three components: an educational attainment component, a country-specific constant, 
and a trend. Letting the average years of schooling control for educational attainment we shall 
write:   
ititi SchoolingtAAh )ln()ln( 1,0,    [28] 
In [28] above, the constant term is meant to capture the initial stock of ideas particular to 
country i , the time trend is meant to allow for the growth of technical progress along the balanced 
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growth path, and the schooling term is meant to capture differences in the level of human capital 
among countries. Incorporating [28] into [27] we shall write: 
titiiiti uusSchoolingtBA ,,1,0, )}1/({
~)/(()ln( )(ln    [29] 
No empirical analysis of labor market activity would be complete without some explicit 
reference to the effects of unemployment benefits. To this effect we have used the replacement rate 
(see OECD 1994, Martin (1996)) to construct a variable which we label "Replacement Wage" and 
which is the product of the wage rate and the replacement rate divided by 100. Accordingly, [29] 
can be rewritten as follows: 
ti
titiiiti
Wageacement
uusSchoolingtBA
,
,,1,0,
)Replln(
))1/((~)/()ln()(ln




 [30] 
In an economy where the agent can choose the number of hours to offer at the market place 
she would be more inclined to choose to be a part-time worker when there are opportunities to 
acquire more schooling, participate in off-the-job training schemes, or do housework. Assuming 
that many part-timers are attending some form of education and/or training, the higher the average 
level of education in an economy, the higher will be the fraction of part-timers. Moreover, to the 
extent that those who attend further, off-the fob training, are entitled to unemployment benefits (or 
to other similar type of benefits) the higher the replacement wage the bigger the inducement to 
choose part-time employment and, say, acquire more schooling. Both of these effects can coincide 
to reduce the number of labor hours supplied by the agent as well as her output. This observation 
suggests that we should include an interaction term between schooling and the replacement wage. 
Once we control for the replacement wage and average educational attainment separately, we 
would expect variations in the interaction term to capture, primarily, the effect of changes in the 
average number of hours of work supplied and the disruption in the productive process associated 
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with entering and exiting the market place. Therefore, we would expect the coefficient on the 
interaction term between the replacement wage and schooling to be negative. These observations 
lead us to adopt the following specification:  
ititti
titiiiti
ageplacementWSchoolingWageplacement
uusSchoolingtBA
)}ln(Re){ln()ln(Re
))1/((~)/()ln()(ln
,
,,1,0,




 [31] 
 Equation [31] is a quasi-reduced form relationship that combines the demand and the 
supply sides of the labor market. To better appreciate the implications/workings of this 
relationship we propose to conduct a thought experiment that traces out the effects of a rise in the 
price of capital on labor supply. According to our earlier analysis, the impact of such a shock 
would be to induce agents to shift some of their labor time in favor of activities akin to installing 
capital. Since installation of capital can be carried out not only in the market sector but also in the 
household sector and since investment in the household sector exceeds investment in the market 
sector (see Greenwood and Hercowitz, 1991) there is also a shift of labor time from the market 
sector to the household sector. At the same time, the rise in the price of capital, by raising the user 
cost of capital, measured by qrMPK )(  , induces firms in the final-goods sector to reduce 
labor demand. Thus, one would expect measured unemployment to rise without any appreciable 
change in the wage rate, a result that would explain the stylized fact that fluctuations in labor 
market activity over the business cycle are primarily accommodated by changes in the rate of 
employment than changes in real wage rates. 
 
 
7. The Empirical Evidence 
7.1 Data and Estimation Methods 
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Our empirical investigation consists of applying panel data methods of estimation - fixed 
effects as well as random effects methods - to a sample of annual data that draws from a pool of 20 
OECD countries. All countries for which data on the variables entering equation [31] could be 
found are included in our sample. Furthermore, the panel is unbalanced in that the period of 
estimation differs between the cross-sectional units depending on data availability. Our benchmark 
regression is a stochastic version of [31] which reads as follows:  
itititit
t,it,ii,t,i
)}u/(u{)WageacementRepl{ln()Schooling{ln(
)WageacementReplln()Schoolingln(tln




154
3210
 [32] 
 The it  terms, above, are assumed to be identically and independently distributed error 
terms with zero mean and constant variance. In fixed effects models the i,0  term captures the 
time-invariant differences between countries, whilst random effects models incorporate this 
heterogeneity into the error term. Definitions and sources of the data employed in estimating [32], 
and a list of the participating countries together with some summary statistics are presented in 
Tables I and II of the Appendix. 
If heterogeneous random coefficients are present and the explanatory variables exhibit 
persistence, dynamic panels (unlike cross sections) are vulnerable to biases that are difficult to 
eliminate by instrumental variables methods (Pesaran and Smith (1995)). After estimating a static 
and a dynamic version of a pooled regression on labor demand, Pesaran and Smith (1995, p.100) 
reported: "The most obvious feature of the results is the erratic performance of the dynamic pooled 
model, whose estimates are very sensitive to specification." Given that our main interest is in 
estimating long-run equilibrium multipliers it is natural to follow the advice of Pesaran and Smith 
(op.cit.) and run static panel regressions. 
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7.2 The Regression Results 
In Table III of the Appendix we report the empirical results from running random and fixed 
effects regressions on [32]. Since much of our focus is on the relation between the wage rate and 
the rate of unemployment we pay particular attention to estimating the coefficient on )1/( uu   
with precision. To this effect, we estimate a version where )1/( uu   is lagged one period, partly 
because it is thought that the effect of unemployment on the real wage rate registers with a lag and 
partly because lagging a variable is thought to provide more consistent estimators in some cases. It 
is reassuring to note that all coefficient estimates are highly significant - most of them at the 1% 
level of significance - and they enter with the hypothesized sign. It is also interesting to note that 
the parameter values for the variables estimated by fixed effects methods are not too dissimilar 
from the parameter values obtained by random effects methods suggesting that treating the 
unobserved, country-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity as part of the error term does not 
severely bias our results. Introducing time dummies in fixed effects provides more information 
about the relationship and it is also a particularly robust specification. As a result, when reporting 
the economic significance of our empirical findings we shall be focusing attention on the 
regression estimates obtained by fixed effects with time dummies.  
The coefficient estimate on the logarithm of the replacement wage ranges from 0.1886 in 
regression (5) to 0.1923 in regression (6). This means that, other things equal, a 10% increase in 
unemployment benefits raises the market, hourly, wage rate by nearly 2% - a rather considerable 
effect. However, other things are not equal since, as hypothesized above, the effect of variations in 
the replacement wage depends, negatively, on the level of schooling. Indeed, this hypothesis is 
confirmed by the coefficient estimate on the interaction term of the logarithm of the replacement 
wage and the logarithm of schooling, an estimate which ranges from -0.1064 in regression (5), to 
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- 0.1082 in regression (6).Given that the sample average for the logarithm of schooling is 2.0566, 
the average treatment effect (ATE) applied on the replacement wage reveals that variations in 
unemployment benefits - all things considered - have a very negligible effect on the market wage 
rate. In fact, if there is any effect at all, this is more likely to be negative as is suggested by a point 
estimate obtained by applying an ATE. The main implication of this finding is that in an aggregate 
model of the labor market, an increase in unemployment insurance interacts with the effectiveness 
of human capital in a way that serves to reduce not only labor supply, but also labor demand, 
leaving the equilibrium wage rate largely unaffected.
6
     
The coefficient estimate on the logarithm of schooling, ranges from 0.3292 in regression 
(5) to 0.3185 in regression (6). Given that the representative agent in the sample has attained, on 
average, 7.8193 years of schooling the regression results suggest that, other things equal, an extra 
year of schooling earns a return of just a little above 4.14%. However, as hypothesized above, 
other things are not equal since the return on schooling depends negatively on the level of 
unemployment benefits proxied by the replacement wage. To reiterate, the higher the level of 
unemployment benefits the higher the incentive to reduce the hours offered in the market place or 
exit the market place, to pursue further schooling. This, in turn, would serve to disrupt the 
production process and, accordingly, reduce productivity and the wage rate offered by firms. 
Given that the coefficient estimate on the interaction term between the logarithm of schooling and 
the logarithm of the replacement wage ranges from -0.1064 to -0.1082 and given that the sample 
average for the logarithm of the replacement wage is 2.2874, the effective net return to an extra 
year of schooling reduces to about 1%. This result, however, should be interpreted with caution for 
                                                          
6
 Wight (1991) reports: "However, if taxes are less than completely experience-rated, then the system with short-time 
compensation encourages underemployment, which in this context means an inefficiently low level of hours per 
employed worker". Accordingly, for any given total of labor hours we would expect a higher number of employed 
workers and also a higher variance in the number of employed workers than in a more efficient system. This, in turn, 
would imply a smaller effectiveness per unit of human capital. 
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several reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, this estimate takes into account the cost to the 
society of the opportunity afforded to the individual for exiting the labor force to attain further 
education. Therefore it is not surprising that some of the studies conducted at the micro level report 
significantly higher returns to education since, by their very nature, these studies cannot capture 
global feedbacks. Secondly, the reported result is only a point estimate that merely records the 
marginal, effective, pecuniary return to an agent who has attained the sample average level of 
schooling.  
Turning attention to the impact of unemployment on pay, and for the reasons indicated 
above, we shall take the coefficient on lagged )1/( uu   to record the more precise impact of 
unemployment on the market wage rate. Given that this coefficient is, about, -0.89 and given that 
the sample average for the unemployment rate is 0.062, the elasticity of the wage rate with respect 
to the rate of unemployment turns out to be - 0.062. At the 99 percent confidence interval the 
coefficient on )1/( uu   lies between -0.58 and -1.26 which, in turn, translates to a confidence 
interval for the elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the unemployment rate between -0.04 and 
-0.09. This compares rather well with the findings of Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) who, on 
page 165, report:  "... In the countries studied in the book, the estimated unemployment elasticity 
of pay is approximately -0.1 ...". Given that the sample of countries, the period under investigation, 
the estimation methods and the level of aggregation in our analysis differ from the study of 
Blanchflower and Oswald, it is comforting to note that our estimates are not too far from theirs. 
A possible question that can be raised at this stage is whether there is a need to apply an 
instrumental variables method of estimation to [32]. To this effect we applied a test advocated by 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1989, 1993) to check the consistency of each estimator separately. To 
implement this test one has to follow a two-step procedure. In the first step, the researcher 
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regresses the explanatory variable that is potentially correlated with the error term on a set of 
"instruments" and collects the residuals. In the second step, the researcher runs an OLS regression 
with all the explanatory variables (including the variable thought to be potentially endogenous) 
and the residuals from the first step. If the coefficient on these residuals is statistically 
insignificant, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variable in question does not suffer 
from an "endogeneity bias" – i.e, a bias which is sufficiently important to render its coefficient 
estimate inconsistent. Suffice to say that we applied this test to all explanatory variables in [32]. 
Additionally, we tested for endogeneity bias by employing a Wu-Hausman test on ln(Schooling), 
ln(Replacement Wage)×ln(Schooling), ln(Replacement Wage) and )1/( uu   taken as a group.7 
The results of the Davidson and MacKinnon, as well as the Wu-Hausman tests are reported in 
Table IV of the Appendix, whereas the definitions of the instruments together with data sources 
are given in Table I of the same Appendix. The test results indicate that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the regressors in [32] (taken separately or as a group) are "exogenous" in the sense 
that the reported coefficient estimates are not seriously biased 
 
8. A Wage Rate Model Applied Empirically to a Cross-Section of Developing and Highly 
Developed Economies   
8.1 Introduction 
Whilst the empirical results obtained by estimating the wage rate model derived in Section 
6 are very gratifying, one may still wonder whether the fundamentals of labor market behavior 
elaborated in this paper are sufficiently robust to be applicable to countries that differ significantly 
in their stage of development. To this effect we have applied a somewhat parsimonious version of 
                                                          
7
 For further details on the Wu-Hausman test please consult Wu (1973) and Hausman (1978), as well as Johnston and 
DiNardo (1997: 257-259). 
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the models described in Sections 6-7 to a group of 45 countries whose economies vary 
significantly in terms of per-capita incomes, and proceeded to estimate this model by a 
cross-section regression. What follows immediately below describes that model.  
 
8.2 The Model 
Letting ,hrw  define the annual real wage rate, multiplying [9b] by )/( Nv , noting that
)/)(/()/( NKKINI  , and taking logarithms, we arrive at an expression for the logarithm of the 
annual wage rate of the ith  country at time t  given by [33a] below:   
  itwln  itititit vvKINKq ))1/(ln()/ln()/ln()1ln(   [33a] 
Taking )1/( vv   to be negatively correlated with u , we shall write: 
itwln  itititit uKINKq 1)/ln()/ln()1ln(           ,01   [33b] 
To model )/ln( KI  we revisit [5] to replace the unobservable )/1(   with a measure of 
education quality to be labeled eq , and to replace the unobservable )1( v  with u  since u and 
)1( v are taken to be positively correlated. Assuming )/( KI  to depend positively on eq  and on 
the interaction between eq and u we shall re-specify [5] by:   
ititit ueqeqKI )})({()()/ln( 32               ,02  ,03   
Collecting terms we arrive at the model to be estimated empirically given by: 
 itititititit ueqequNKqw )})({()/ln()1ln()ln( 321    [33c] 
A particularly rewarding feature of the specification expressed by [33c] is the fact that it 
makes explicit the role of the price of capital in determining the equilibrium real wage rate. 
Equally rewarding is the fact that [33c] allows the reader to disentangle and distinguish between 
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the forces that shift the supply schedule for labor and the forces that shift the demand schedule for 
labor.  
A rise in the price of capital, for instance, shifts the supply schedule for labor inwards: 
other things equal, by making investment more attractive, a rise in the price of capital requires a 
rise in the wage rate to allow individuals to continue supplying the same amount of labor services 
to the final-goods sector. Other things equal, a rise in the capital-labor ratio, ),/( NK  by raising 
the marginal product of labor, shifts out the demand schedule for labor allowing firms to raise their 
wage offer. Other things equal, the higher is the share of labor allocated to the intermediary- goods 
sector, measured by )1( v , the lower the value added per unit labor engaged in that sector and, 
thus, the more attractive it is to work in the final-goods sector. Since a high )1( v is thought to be 
associated with a high rate of unemployment, other things equal a high rate of unemployment 
induces workers to accept a lower wage rate. Other things equal, the higher the quality of 
education of those engaged in the intermediate-goods sector, measured by ,eq  the higher is the 
productivity of that sector and the higher the wage rate required to maintain the given allocation of 
labor between sectors. Finally, the higher is the effectiveness/productivity of those engaged in the 
intermediary-goods sector, approximated by the interaction term )],)([( ueq  the higher the value 
added per unit of labor time allocated in that sector requiring a higher wage rate to maintain labor 
market equilibrium, other things equal. 
Table VI in the Appendix presents the empirical estimates derived from applying a 
cross-section regression to the relation described by [33c]. The footnote to the table lists the 
countries to which [33c] has been applied to. The list of the relevant data utilized and its sources 
are presented in Table V of the same Appendix. 
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8.3 Commenting on the Empirical Findings 
Apart from the coefficient estimate on eq  which is statistically insignificant, all other 
coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% or the 5% level. They are also correctly 
signed, and their numerical estimates are, generally, in accord with the model’s predictions and/or 
in accord with predictions from other studies. 
Whilst the point estimate on )1ln( q turns out to be considerably larger than its 
hypothesized value of unity it is comforting to note that the 95% confidence interval containing the 
“true” parameter value attached to )1ln( q ranges between 0.92 and 1.9, a range that includes the 
hypothesized value for the alluded point estimate. 
With sample averages for u  and eq  equal to 0.0912 and 1.0781, respectively, the 
estimated parameter values attached to the u  and the )])([( ueq terms imply a wage-curve elasticity 
of -0.1172 – a parameter value which satisfies the empirical regularity reported by Blanchflower 
and Oswald (op.cit.) .  
The point estimate on the )])([( ueq term together with the sample averages for u  and eq  
reported above imply a wage rate elasticity with respect to the quality of the labor force employed 
in the intermediary-goods sector a little over 5. One reason that this elasticity seems exceedingly 
large is the fact that the sample average for the rate of unemployment is much larger than the rate 
one usually associates with advanced economies. A glance at the data for advanced economies 
suggests that the estimated parameter value for the )])([( ueq  term implies a wage rate elasticity 
with respect to the quality of labor in advanced economies of about 3. Nevertheless, and 
notwithstanding the fact the coefficient estimate on the )])([( ueq term is not very precisely 
estimated, one may well argue that investing in the quality of education-particularly in less 
advanced economies- seems to hold the key to prosperity. 
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As anticipated, the elasticity of the real wage rate with respect to the capital-labor ratio,
)/( NK , is not significantly different from one. All in all, the above results lend further support to 
our model and compliment nicely the results obtained by panel data methods of estimation. 
 
9. The Informal Economy and the Price of Capital: A Further Application 
In an empirical investigation involving two cross-section regressions applied to a group of 
62 countries – both developing and highly developed – Pikoulakis (2010), by deriving the exact 
same model described in this paper finds that, contrary to claims by Schneider (2002), neither the 
corporate tax rate nor the personal tax rate are statistically significant in explaining the size of the 
informal economy once the effects of the price of capital and the effects of geography- a variable 
recording the percentage of a country’s land area that lies within the geographical tropics- have 
been controlled for. Since the price of capital has been shown to play a pivotal role in explaining 
the behavior of the unemployment rate and of the wage rate, we thought that it may be of interest to 
the reader to mention that the analysis reported in this paper equally applies to a range of diverse 
issues such as, for instance, the size of the informal economy. For the convenience of the reader the 
empirical findings on the size of the informal economy reported in Pikoulakis (op.cit.) are 
reproduced in Table VII of the Appendix. For a description of the data and its sources used in these 
regressions the reader may consult Pikoulakis (op.cit.). The diagram below is a scatter plot of data 
measuring the logarithm of the size of the informal economy and the logarithm of the price of 
capital.     
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10. Summary and Conclusions 
What recommends the theoretical part of our paper is its simplicity, its transparency, its 
analytical tractability, and its ability not only to explain away real wage rate rigidities without 
resorting to market imperfections, but also to explain such diverse issues as Okun’s Law and the 
size of the informal economy. The fact that the price of capital plays a pivotal role in explaining the 
movements in labor supply and labor demand makes the model closer in spirit with Phelps (1994) 
and Phelps and Zoega (1998). Also, by allowing for the presence of homework, the model brings 
out the fact that variations in the price of capital elicit not only inter-temporal substitution effects 
but also intra-temporal substitution effects which, in turn, makes it easier to explain away real 
wage rigidities without having to appeal to the notion of shirking.  What recommends the 
empirical part of our paper is its ability to demonstrate that the postulated wage-setting behavior is 
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strongly supported by the data across a diverse spectrum of economies, and that the empirical 
regularity reported in Blanchflower and Oswald (op.cit) is also supported by both the model and 
the data. 
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APPENDIX 
Table I 
Variables Used to Estimate Equation [32] 
Variable Definition 
LN() Natural logarithm of the wage rate. The wage rate  is defined as the 
average real wage expressed in 1996 purchasing power parity divided 
by the annual hours worked per employee. The wage rate is taken from 
Marquetti (2004) and the hours data come from Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre and the Conference Board (2006). 
LN(Schooling) Natural logarithm of the average schooling years in the total population 
in the age group over age 25. Source: Barro and Lee (2001). 
LN(Rep. Wage) Natural logarithm of the replacement wage. The replacement wage is a 
product of the wage rate  defined above and the average gross 
unemployment benefit replacement rate sourced from OECD, 
Tax-Benefit Models available at 
www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives. 
(u/(1-u)) Unemployment-to-employment ratio defined as a difference between 
total labor force and total employment divided by total employment. 
Source: OECD Population and Labour Force Statistics. 
Additional variables used as instruments in the endogeneity tests 
Government General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
Fertility Fertility rate, total (births per woman). Source: World Development 
Indicators. 
ESI Economic Security Index. Source: International Labor Organization 
(2004). 
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Table II 
Sample Composition and Variable Averages 
 Starting Date
1
 
Number of 
observations 
LN(Wage Rate) LN(Schooling) LN(Rep. Wage) u/(1-u) 
Australia 1965 33 2.3809 2.3026 0.8400 0.0630 
Austria 1969 30 2.3943 2.0668 1.0860 0.0293 
Belgium 1964 35 2.4561 2.0992 1.5687 0.0855 
Canada 1964 34 2.4444 2.2852 0.6866 0.0847 
Denmark 1964 35 2.4562 2.2336 1.5979 0.0614 
Finland 1964 35 2.1548 2.0641 0.5521 0.0647 
France 1971 27 2.5096 1.9476 1.3390 0.0873 
Greece 1965 33 1.5625 1.8627 -1.0267 0.0609 
Ireland 1964 35 1.9422 2.0166 0.5181 0.1162 
Italy 1964 35 2.3080 1.7265 -1.5180 0.0923 
Japan 1964 35 1.8016 2.0968 -0.4386 0.0218 
Netherlands 1976 23 2.7096 2.1322 2.0453 0.0841 
New Zealand 1976 8 2.3939 2.4267 1.1310 0.0247 
Norway 1964 29 2.3798 2.0931 0.4114 0.0234 
Portugal 1975 21 1.7717 1.2981 -0.0815 0.0715 
Spain 1964 33 2.0378 1.6279 0.6074 0.1345 
Sweden 1965 32 2.5639 2.1927 0.8106 0.0354 
Switzerland 1964 30 2.6877 2.1975 -0.2371 0.0058 
USA 1964 33 2.6703 2.3921 0.5318 0.0644 
United Kingdom 1964 33 2.2820 2.0999 0.7727 0.0672 
Sample  609 2.2874 2.0566 0.5155 0.0658 
1
 Note that variables which have been lagged in the regression equation start at an earlier date.  
36 
 
Table III 
Empirical Determinants of Ln() 
 Fixed Effect Panel Random Effect Panel 
Fixed Effect Panel with 
Time Dummies 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant   1.3117
***
 
(0.2015) 
1.3115
***
 
(0.2000) 
  
LN(Schooling) 0.2271
**
 
(0.1090)       
0.2262
**
 
(0.1079) 
0.2987
***
 
(0.1009) 
0.2963
***
 
(0.1000) 
0.3292
***
 
(0.0915) 
0.3185
***
 
(0.0913) 
LN(Rep. Wage) 0.2166
***
 
(0.0535)  
0.2212
***
 
(0.0531) 
0.2000
***
 
(0.0528) 
0.2049
***
 
(0.0524) 
0.1886
***
 
(0.0442) 
0.1923
***
 
(0.0441) 
LN(Schooling)   
LN(Rep. Wage) 
-0.0972
***
 
(0.0266) 
-0.1009
***
 
(0.0264) 
-0.0890
***
 
(0.0263) 
-0.0929
***
 
(0.0261) 
-0.1064
***
 
(0.0220) 
-0.1082
***
 
(0.0219) 
u/(1-u) -0.7580
***
 
(0.0266) 
 -0.7679
***
 
(0.1723) 
 -0.8645
***
 
(0.1531) 
 
u/(1-u)_Lag  -0.9459
***
 
(0.1753) 
 -0.9505
***
 
(0.1744) 
 -0.8856
***
 
(0.1548) 
Trend 0.0238
***
 
(0.0013) 
0.0245
***
 
(0.0014) 
0.0230
***
 
(0.0013) 
0.0238
***
 
(0.0013) 
  
R-square 90.99% 91.13% 90.70% 90.85% 94.35% 94.36% 
Note: The standard errors are given in parentheses. To conserve space the fixed and random effects, as well as the coefficient on time dummies are not reported. 
***
, 
** 
denote statistical significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively.  
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Table IV 
Results of Endogeneity Tests 
Panel A. Results of the Davidson and MacKinnon (1989, 1993) Tests 
Instrumented Variable Instruments t-stat p-value 
LN(Schooling) Fertility, Government, Lagged 
LN(Schooling), ESI, LN(Rep. 
Wage), u/(1-u), Trend, 19 
Country Dummies 
0.1634 0.8703 
LN(Rep. Wage) Lagged LN(Rep. Wage), ESI, 
LN(Schooling),  u/(1-u), Trend, 
19 Country Dummies 
-0.1058 0.9158 
LN(Schooling) 
LN(Rep. Wage) 
(Lagged LN(Schooling)  
Lagged LN(Rep. Wage)), 
LN(Schooling), LN(Rep. Wage), 
u/(1-u), Trend, 20 Country 
Dummies 
0.3017 0.7630 
u/(1-u) Government, Lagged u/(1-u), 
ESI, LN(Schooling),  LN(Rep. 
Wage), Trend, 19 Country 
Dummies 
-0.6346 0.5259 
Panel B. Results of the Wu-Hausman Test 
Instrumented Variables Instruments χ2-stat p-value 
LN(Schooling), 
LN(Rep. Wage),  
LN(Schooling)  
LN(Rep. Wage), 
u/(1-u) 
Government, Fertility, Lagged 
LN(Schooling), Lagged u/(1-u), 
Lagged LN(Rep. Wage), 
(Lagged LN(Schooling)  
Lagged LN(Rep. Wage)), Trend, 
20 Country Dummies    
3.9240 0.4164 
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Table V 
The Data Utilized in the Regression Reported in Table VI 
Variable Definition 
w The (average) wage rate    [the wage share in (GDP)]x[(GDP) per worker]. 
The source for the wage share is the Extended Penn World Tables 4.0 .The 
source for GDP per worker is the Pen World Tables 7.0. 
eq The education quality ERSIe : where ERSI= Estimated Returns to Schooling 
of Immigrants in: Schoellman (2012).   
u The average rate of unemployment: Source: UNECE (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe). 
q-1 The marginal cost of investment {(price level of investment)/(price level of 
GDP)}. Source: PWT 7.0. 
(K/N) Capital per worker : (K/Y)/(Y/N). The source for (K/Y) is EPWT 4.0 and the 
source for (Y/N) is the PWT 7.0 
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Table VI 
Empirical Determinants of Ln(w) in a Cross-Section Regression 
Variable      Estimates 
Constant -0.4430 
(2.2757) 
eq 0.0908 
(2.4819) 
(eq)(u) 57.9024
**
 
(25.4645) 
u -63.7102
**
 
(27.8876) 
ln(q-1) 1.4116
***
 
(0.2499) 
ln(K/N) 1.0829
***
 
(0.0513) 
Number of obs. 45 
F(5, 39) 287.74 
Prob(F-stat) 0.0000 
R
2
 0.9665 
Root MSE 0.2038 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Countries included in the 
regression are (1) Algeria (2) Australia (3) Austria (4) 
Belgium (5) Bolivia (6) Botswana (7) Canada (8) Chile (9) 
Colombia (10) Costa Rica (11) Cote D’Ivoire (12) Denmark 
(13) Egypt (14) Finland (15) France (16) Greece (17) Hong 
Kong (18) Ireland (19) Israel (20) Italy (21) Jamaica (22) 
Japan (23) Jordan  (24) Korea, Republic of (25) Mauritius 
(26) Mexico (27) Morocco (28) Netherlands (29) New 
Zealand (30) Norway (31) Panama (32) Peru (33) Philippines 
(34) Portugal (35) South Africa (36) Spain (37) Sri Lanka (38) 
Sweden (39) Switzerland (40) UK (41) Trinidad & Tobago 
(42) Tunisia (43) Uruguay (44) USA (45) Venezuela 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.  
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Table VII 
Empirical Determinants of Ln(Informal) 
 (1) (2) 
Constant -1.6793
***
 
(0.0749) 
-0.9190
***
 
(0.3488) 
ln(q) 0.6233
***
 
(0.1477) 
0.7178
***
 
(0.0965) 
Geography 0.5445
***
 
(0.1829) 
 
Geography*ln(q) -0.3607 
(0.2392) 
 
Corporate Tax Rate  -0.0131 
(0.0114) 
Individual Tax Rate  -0.0045 
(0.0049) 
R-squared 0.4981 0.4220 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
***
 denotes statistical significance at 1% level.  
